Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought

In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-55 (2016)
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Aidan McGlynn
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
Perspectives on de se immunity.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10089-10107.

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