Jeffrey conditioning, rigidity, and the defeasible red jelly bean

Philosophical Studies 168 (2):569-582 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Jonathan Weisberg has argued that Jeffrey Conditioning is inherently “anti-holistic” By this he means, inter alia, that JC does not allow us to take proper account of after-the-fact defeaters for our beliefs. His central example concerns the discovery that the lighting in a room is red-tinted and the relationship of that discovery to the belief that a jelly bean in the room is red. Weisberg’s argument that the rigidity required for JC blocks the defeating role of the red-tinted light rests on the strong assumption that all posteriors within the distribution in this example are rigid on a partition over the proposition that the jelly bean is actually red. But individual JC updates of propositions do not require such a broad rigidity assumption. Jeffrey conditionalizers should consider the advantages of a modest project of targeted updating focused on particular propositions rather than seeking to update the entire distribution using one obvious partition. Although Weisberg’s example fails to show JC to be irrelevant or useless, other problems he raises for JC (the commutativity and inputs problems) remain and actually become more pressing when we recognize the important role of background information.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,343

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?Carl Wagner - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution.Borut Trpin - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2985-3012.
Jeffrey Conditionalization Permits Undermining.Marc Lange - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (3):585-591.
Radical probabilism and bayesian conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
Holistic Conditionalization and Underminable Perceptual Learning.Brian T. Miller - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):130-149.
Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations.Borut Trpin & Max Pellert - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):977-1001.
Three models of sequential belief updating on uncertain evidence.James Hawthorne - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity.Dilip Ninan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):401-413.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-17

Downloads
74 (#293,655)

6 months
5 (#702,808)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.
Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793-812.
A note on Jeffrey conditionalization.Hartry Field - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):361-367.
Confirmational holism and bayesian epistemology.David Christensen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):540-557.
Old evidence and new theories.Lyle Zynda - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):67 - 95.

View all 8 references / Add more references