Love's Exemplars: A Response to Gupta, Earp, and Savulescu

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (2):101-102 (2016)
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Abstract

I am grateful to Brian Earp, Julian Savulescu, and Kristina Gupta for their thoughtful remarks on my paper. I cannot answer all of their points here, but select what I consider to be the most important. Gupta believes that I commit myself to “a common sense” account of love. This is not so. “Common sense” refers to beliefs, not concepts. Concepts can be used to express true, false, and diametrically opposed beliefs, so are not themselves beliefs; rather, they are the logical precondition for holding beliefs. When I say, “red is a color,” I am not advocating on behalf of common sense, still less making a claim held by any “dominant social group.” Suppose Gupta disagrees and says, “The red-green...

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