Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism

Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137 (2011)
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Abstract

In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution

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Sarah McGrath
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Autonomy and Aesthetic Engagement.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1127-1156.
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Expertise.Alvin I. Goldman - 2018 - Topoi 37 (1):3-10.

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