Abstract

This dissertation presents a discussion and analysis of scientific plausibility which will explicate the term "plausible" when used in scientific contexts such as references to explanations being more or less plausible than others. "Plausibility" is a term which has been associated with the so-called contexts of justification, pursuit and discovery in philosophy of science, and I conclude herein that philosophers and sociologists of science have often conflated the related, although not identical, concepts of "plausibility" and "pursuit-worthiness." Such conflations result in unnecessary epistemological skepticism, particularly when investigating our justified belief in scientific theories. This dissertation illustrates the dangers of such conflations, and through a thorough explication of plausibility and pursuit-worthiness, attempts to eliminate them. ;This project's importance is threefold. The philosophical investigation of scientific experiment, most particularly the epistemology of experiment, seems to demand an accurate and complete account of plausibility. More generally, the epistemology of science as construed in theory confirmation requires such an account. Specifically, probabilistic accounts of theory confirmation, with their dependence upon the "prior probability" of hypotheses contain implicit references to plausibility. This dissertation relies on two historical case studies which will show previous accounts of plausibility to be woefully incomplete. Examining the experimental studies of polywater in the late 1960's and so-called cold fusion in the late 1980's adds an important historical component to the philosophical analysis, actually contributing to both the philosophical and historical literature