Reliabilism and Relativism

In McKenna Robin, Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Society Conference (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Process reliabilism says that a belief is justified iff the belief-forming process that produced it is sufficiently reliable. But any token belief-forming process is an instance of a number of different belief-forming process types. The problem of specifying the relevant type is known as the ‘generality problem’ for process reliabilism. This paper proposes a broadly relativist solution to the generality problem. The thought is that the relevant belief-forming process type is relative to the context. While the basic idea behind the solution is from Mark Heller (1995), the solution defended here departs from Heller on a crucial point. Because of this departure, my solution avoids a serious problem with Heller’s solution.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-01

Downloads
407 (#74,054)

6 months
95 (#67,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robin McKenna
University of Liverpool

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein, Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Causal explanation.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-240.
The myth of knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):57-83.

View all 13 references / Add more references