Abstract

In this dissertation I explain and defend the theory of substance Aristotle presents in the Categories. In the Categories, primary substances enjoy a degree of ontologrelative to other existents. Furthermore, Aristotle finds in the Categories at a subset of concrete particulars, the animate individuals, best meet certain independence conditions and thus, best qualify as primary substances. There has been a scholarly consensus that the theory of the Categories is---at worst---internally incoherent and---at best---both seriously incomplete and inconsistent with ontological views Aristotle espouses elsewhere . I defend Aristotle's Categories ontology against these charges. ;Several features are thought to compromise the ontological independence of Categories primary substances. First, animate individuals belong to species and genera which essentially characterize them. As such, the animate individuals appear to depend on species and genera for their existence. Some have thought that this problem renders Aristotle's Categories theory incoherent. Second, concrete particulars have essential and non-essential properties. If the relation between concrete particulars and their properties is such that the concrete particulars are entirely constituted by those properties, the concrete particulars fail to be ontologically independent. I hold that Aristotle addresses this difficulty in Metaphysics Zeta.3. Third, in the Metaphysics, De Anima, Physics and other works, Aristotle clearly holds that animate individuals are composites, in some sense, of form and matter. As such, matter appears to be a better candidate for primary substance than the animate individuals of the Categories. ;I defend Aristotle's Categories ontology on all these fronts. I show that the independence of animate individuals is not compromised by their membership in species and genera. Thus, on this score, the Categories is not internally incoherent. I argue for a reading of Metaphysics Zeta.3 whereby Aristotle presents a choice between a bundle theory and bare particular theory of concrete particulars. I argue that Aristotle rejects both theories in favor of a theory where concrete particulars are substances. The views developed in Metaphysics Zeta.3, then, are consistent with the Categories theory. I argue that the independence of animate individuals is not compromised by their status as form-matter composites since individual form and proximate matter are entirely coincident over the lifetime of the individual. On this score also, the Categories theory is consistent with the hylomorphism of the Metaphysics, De Anima, or Physics. In general I hold that, while incomplete, the Categories presents all the elements of a powerful interesting and philosophically defensible ontology