Cognitive disability and cognitive enhancement

Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):582-605 (2009)
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Abstract

This essay explores problems of consistency among commonsense beliefs about the comparative moral status of animals, fetuses, and human beings congenitally endowed with cognitive capacities and potential no higher than those of higher animals. The possibility of genetic cognitive enhancement exacerbates some of these problems, but also offers new resources for understanding the basis of our moral status as inviolable.

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reprint McMahan, Jeff (2010) "Cognitive Disability and Cognitive Enhancement". In Kittay, Eva Feder, Carlson, Licia, Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, pp. 345–367: Wiley-Blackwell (2010)

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Author's Profile

Jeff McMahan
Oxford University

References found in this work

“Our fellow creatures”.Jeff McMahan - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):353 - 380.
Moral status and human enhancement.Allen Buchanan - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):346-381.
9.1. The Radically Cognitively Limited.Jeff Mcmahan - 2009 - In Kimberley Brownlee & Adam Cureton (eds.), Disability and Disadvantage. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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