Abstract

This study addresses a very basic question aimed at a central problem in Foucault: How is it possible to reject the Transcendental Subject and simultaneously hold for the possibility of freedom, creativity and meaningful political activity? ;It will be argued that an answer can be found in a rethinking of the subject which is continuously, albeit implicitly, evolving in his work. ;Chapter I poses the problem in terms of the role of the intellectual as social critic. This figure serves as an example of political resistance from which we move to the question of the possibility of any meaningful resistance. We examine Foucault's critique of the traditional Subject and his own theories about the constitution of subjects. In that light we begin to look at how he nonetheless believes resistance is possible. ;Chapter II looks more deeply at his understanding of the constitution of subjects and takes up the question of the subject as "soul"; the persistence of the problem of dualism when the subject is so conceived; the way Foucault's use of this term begins his effort to rethink the subject. What emerges is a concept we have termed the "body-subject." ;Chapter III develops this concept and looks at the interplay of institutional power, bodies and truth in the constitution of souls and subjects. It shows how Foucault's understanding of "subjects", "souls" and "truth" all appear to be founded on the body. So, too, is the possibility of resistance. ;Chapter IV returns to the problem of resistance, and by examining three examples from different periods of his work demonstrates how Foucault grounds resistance in the body. ;Chapter V returns to problems of the intellectual's resistance, especially of grounding intellectual activity in the body. Finally, we assess Foucault's success in avoiding recourse to traditional notions of subject, the usefulness and implications of "body-subject" as a philosophical concept and directions which must be followed to complete what he began in rethinking the subject