Abstract

This dissertation aims to establish the relationship between transcendental arguments and skepticism by critically analyzing Kant's transcendental proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason and the transcendental arguments presented by linguistic philosophers. In the first chapter, Kant's use of "transcendental" is considered. Here I maintain that "transcendental" is typically used by Kant in conjunction with a second order, extra-empirical investigation into the conditions necessary for, and limits of human experience and knowledge. In chapter two, Kant's notion of objective validity is analyzed in light of his use of the terms "concept", "object", and "pure intuition". This analysis reveals that for Kant an empirical judgement is objectively valid if it employs a concept of an object that unifies our sensory modes of knowledge, is mind-independent, and is inter-subjectively accessible. Turning to an analysis of Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism in chapter three, I reveal five fundamental axioms that weave their way throughout Kant's transcendental proofs, and show that Kant does not entirely succeed in establishing the objective validity of the categories, because he does not overcome the problem of incommensurability. This shortcoming on Kant's part leads to an analysis of the transcendental arguments presented by Strawson, Davidson and Putnam in chapter four. By analyzing these arguments I show that each philosopher employs certain transcendental propositions or axioms in their understanding of language as an instrument of communication, and argue that if their arguments are not to collapse into a linguistic idealism, then they must be supplemented by something like the arguments presented by Kant in the Second Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism. Finally, in chapter five I argue that transcendental philosophy and skepticism are engaged in an ongoing dialectic, where the fundamental axioms incorporated in our best reflective understanding of our cognitive activities are revealed through transcendental reasoning in its attack against skepticism, only to be challenged by subsequent skeptical argument. The legacy of this dialectic is the contribution it makes to our understanding of ourselves as thinkers and doers