Revising Carnap’s Semantic Conception of Modality

Studia Logica 100 (3):497-515 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I provide a tableau system and completeness proof for a revised version of Carnap's semantics for quantified modal logic. For Carnap, a sentence is possible if it is true in some first order model. However, in a similar fashion to second order logic, no sound and complete proof theory can be provided for this semantics. This factor contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Carnapian modal logic from contemporary philosophical discussion. The proof theory I discuss comes close to Carnap's semantic vision and provides an interesting counterpoint to mainstream approaches to modal logic. Despite its historical origins, my intention is to demonstrate that this approach to modal logic is worthy of contemporary attention and that current debate is the poorer for its absence

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-07-03

Downloads
134 (#165,422)

6 months
7 (#718,806)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Toby Meadows
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans. Pears and McGuinness).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1921 - New York,: Routledge. Edited by Luciano Bazzocchi & P. M. S. Hacker.
Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16:83-94.
First-order logic.Raymond Merrill Smullyan - 1968 - New York [etc.]: Springer Verlag.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed.) - 1960 - Frankfurt am Main: [Suhrkamp].

View all 18 references / Add more references