Agency and mental action

Philosophical Perspectives 11:231-249 (1997)
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Abstract

My question here is whether there are intentional mental actions that generate special, significant threats to causalism (i.e., threats of a kind not generated by intentional overt actions), or that generate, more poi- gnantly, problems for causalism that some intentional overt actions allegedly generate, as well.

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reprint Mele, Alfred R. (1997) "Agency and Mental Action". Noûs 31(s11):231-249

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

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