A Daring Soft Libertarian Response to Present Luck

In Free Will and Luck. New York, US: Oxford University Press (2006)
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Abstract

This chapter constructs a libertarian view that grants the main moral of Frankfurt-style cases, and offers a resolution of the problem of present luck. Attention to how human beings may develop from neonates who do not even act intentionally into free, morally responsible human agents proves instructive in developing the resolution.

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10.1093/0195305043.003.0005

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

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