Intentional action and wayward causal chains: The problem of tertiary waywardness [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 51 (1):55 - 60 (1987)
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10.1007/bf00353962

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

Citations of this work

The contours of control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Perception is not all-purpose.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
The problem of action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-62.
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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