Libertarianism, luck, and control

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407 (2005)
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Abstract

This article critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that luck poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarians.

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reprint Mele, Alfred R. (2006) "Libertarianism, Luck, and Control". In Mele, Alfred R., Free Will and Luck, pp. : Oxford University Press (2006)

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

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