Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom

In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 251--264 (2003)
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Abstract

In this chapter, drawing partly on some attractions to soft libertarianism and on a libertarian approach articulated in Mele (1996) to accommodating successful Frankfurt-style cases, I motivate the thesis that at least some human beings sometimes act freely than that no human being ever acts freely.

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.
Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.
Moral responsibility and agents’ histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.
On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case.Carl Ginet & David Palmer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.

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