Abstract

Looking at a photograph we say : 'this is John'. Let us now raise the question : 'what is really happening here ?'. The common opinion as well as the traditional philosophical argument may well be stated as follows : „we view the picture and then, because we perceive a likeness, we say : 'this is John'. In other words, we identify John on the photograph by virtue of a perceived resemblance ; i.e. the perception of the likeness, the comparison, is the fundamental process, and the statement 'this is John' is only a verbal formula. The fundamental process provides us with the explanation of the identifying process, or, to put it very simply : the comparison 'explains' the statement." This argument has somehow been repeated, relentlessly and unquestioningly, by almost all philosophers who have considered this matter. What is really happening then, when we say 'this is John ?' We do not state any likeness, we simply identify the man on the picture as John. We do not state any likeness, because we do not see any likeness ; what we see is (a picture of) John. We do identify, we do recognize. But we do not recognize, because we compare, say, the picture and some inner representation which is conjured up by it ; no such comparison is to be found in our mental process, if we look at it properly. What allows us then to identify John on the picture, to say : 'this is John' ? We have seen John, often or only once, and our experience of him as provided us with much information about his way of walking, speaking and the rest ; but what matters in connection with the photograph, is that our experience has provided us with a mental image of John. We certainly use this mental image, when we identify John on the photograph, but we do not use it as a means of comparing. At the moment of the identification the mental image is neither used in its representational function, nor is it utilized to furnish a term of comparison with the photograph. Yet, we must suppose that there is such an image in our mind, virtually present all the time, and then visibly actualized on the photograph. Thus, we identify John on the photograph, not on the basis of some comparison (which does not take place). The statement 'this is John' is the verbal expression of the fact that our virtual mental image has been concretely actualized on this photograph. One example might illustrate our argument. Let us consider what happens when we see a picture of Napoleon. We have never seen the Emperor and we certainly cannot perceive any likeness between the man and the picture. Yet we can recognize him, identify the picture as a picture of Napoleon. We may indeed have seen other pictures of him, and this iconographical experience has provided us with the mental image which we use as a normative image. In identifying Napoleon on the picture we do not really compare it with any other representation conjured up in our mind by the picture ; the picture itself actualizes a virtual mental image, which therefore cannot be used as material for comparison but only functions as a normative image. We may conclude that the definition of picture - we take it to be a current one - according to which the picture is a material thing denoting another thing by virtue of visual likeness, is insufficient. This becomes even more obvious, if we consider non-figurative pictures ; indeed these evoke no mental image, not even in its normative function, let alone in its representational function. Consequently, we must look for another definition which can also include non-figurative pictures. We may probably suggest a new definition : a material picture is a visual thing which establishes itself as a self-contained phenomenal unity and identity, and which therefore neutralizes itself as a mode of appearance of a material object. In this sense the picture is to be seen as an autonomous thing, or more precisely, as a self-contained visual phenomenon