Abstract

Since the introduction of the concept of testimonial injustice, it has been a matter of dispute if giving credit to a speaker in excess of their reliability is generally a wrong. This question is closely related to the applicability of theories of distributive justice to credibility: If credibility is scarce, giving one too much is withholding it from another. In this paper, we use a Bayesian reconstruction of testimony to capture these two issues. The formal analysis allows us to differentiate two competing notions of credibility, both of which seem to be at play in the debate. We show that the answer to both the above questions depends on which concept of credibility is accepted in a given dispute, thus clarifying and making more precise what is at stake and in some cases even resolving the issue. To complete the argument on potential applications of distributive justice to credibility, we discuss the question of an obviously ideal allocation of credibility, developing an alternative representation of prejudice within the model in the process. We conclude that distributive justice is, given the formal explication and specified qualifications, applicable to the allocation of credibility.