Abstract

Have you been told that there's one basic template for "manipulation arguments for incompatibilism"? The popularity and of the narrative is weird, right? I mean, it's been demonstrated that people who make such claims are making a false empirical claim as well as getting the logic and dialectic surrounding manipulation arguments wrong. Eg., it's an empirical fact that the Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument does not have the same underlying logical structure or conclusion as the revised version of the Revised Zygote Argument (developed by Mickelson) for mere incompossibilism -- Alfred Mele began to endorse Mickelson's RZA in 2012 after she noted a serious flaw the original version of Mele's argument had the same explanatory conclusion as its predecessor, the Four-Case Argument, but offered no support in the premises to justify that explanatory conclusion over equally-plausible rival explanations (for all Mele has ever said on the matter). Oddly, the discipline norm is to call this RZA an argument for incompatibilism, even though this requires us to use 'incompatibilism' to refer to a non-explanatory thesis while giving the false impression that the term 'incompatibilism' is being used (as it was when applied to the conclusions of the original ZA and its predecessor the Four-Case Argument) to pick out an explanatory claim about the "threat" that determinism-related factors pose to free will. Few philosophers can tell you in clear terms why RZA is characterized as having the same explanatory conclusion of the Four-Case Argument, even though this is patently false. But why fuss over the distinction between the non-explanatory conclusion of RZA and 4CA -- don't we get the explanation "for free"? Okay, that's interesting; philosophical research is not generally known for its permissive attitude towards those who try to sneak off with free lunches. But it's worse that bad methodological hygiene. K. Mickelson's Master Manipulation Argument concludes that the explanatory "incompatibilist" conclusion of Pereboom's argument is false while granting that the non-explanatory "incompatibilist" conclusion of RZA is true. This demonstrates, beyond a doubt, that the two theses can and do come apart in philosophically and dialectically INTERESTING ways. EG. Looking at RZA, we observe that it's non-explanatory conclusion includes metaphysically arbitrary scope restrictions (e.g. "ordinary human", "worlds at which determinism is true"). Finding a philosophical justification for these scope restrictions is exceedingly difficult. Looking to 4CA, we see that Pereboom attempted to use a best-explanation hypothesis piggy-backed on a slippery-slope generalization argument. But because Pereboom fails to recognize that the conclusion of RZA is an metaphysically arbitrary thesis, he fails to realize that he (i) started his best-explanation reason prematurely and (ii) failed to complete it. For lack of being challenged to fix these problems (because "why fuss" of the non-explanatory conclusion of RZA and explanatory conclusion of 4CA, amirite?), the community has overlooked that there is a tension between the explanatory claims of Pereboom's "hard incompatibilism" position that ensures that the position will fail on its own terms (due to internal inconsistencies). But, hey. Just seems a little weird that so many people give lip service to the aim of getting the logic and dialectic of manipulation arguments right but won't both to mention things like the logical and dialectically-relevant differences between the most important manipulation arguments out there. Why do so many philosophers bother with all the talk about the logic and dialectic when, by all appearances, they are more interested in preserving a debunked status quo that actually getting the logic and dialectic of these arguments right? Maybe next time someone tries to sell you some false narratives about "manipulation arguments for incompatibilism" being instances of the same basic 2-premise template, you should ask them. ;)