Substance and Identity-Dependence

Philosophical Papers 35 (1):103-118 (2006)
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Abstract

There is no consensus on how to define substance, but one popular view is that substances are entities that are independent in some sense or other.  E. J. Lowe’s version of this approach stresses that substances are not dependent on other particulars for their identity.  I develop the meaning of this proposal, defend it against some criticisms, and then show that others do require that the theory be modified.

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Michael Gorman
Catholic University of America

Citations of this work

Metaphysical Foundationalism: Consensus and Controversy.Thomas Oberle - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):97-110.
Are Organisms Substances or Processes?William Morgan - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):605-619.
Independence accounts of substance and substantial parts.Patrick Toner - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):37 - 43.
On substantial independence: a reply to Patrick Toner.Michael Gorman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):293-297.

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References found in this work

XIV*—Ontological Dependence.Kit Fine - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):269-290.
Primitive Substances.E. J. Lowe - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):531 - 552.
The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time *[REVIEW]Gary Rosenkrantz - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):728-736.

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