The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,010

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Horwich on the Value of Truth.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):263–279.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Expressivism and the Value of Truth.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.
The weight of truth.Xintong Wei - 2024 - Synthese 204 (2):1-24.
Epistemic Emotions and the Value of Truth.Laura Candiotto - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):563-577.
Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-04

Downloads
4 (#1,803,471)

6 months
4 (#1,249,230)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references