Hypocritical Blame: A Question for the Normative Accounts of Assertion

Philosophia 48 (4):1543-1549 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An agent A blames B hypocritically for violating a moral norm N if and only if: A is likewise blameworthy for violating N, and A is not disposed to blame herself for violating N. Normally, an assertion involving blame is retracted following the objection that and hold. I discuss two prima facie explanations for such a withdrawal: that the objection hampers the speaker’s assertoric authority, rendering and the necessary condition to assert, and that the joint condition is, instead, merely a regulative rule. Having shown that the former option is too revisory as it requires reformulation of all normative accounts of assertion on the table, and the latter false, I proceed to argue that and do not target assertions to begin with. An assertion involving blame is, instead, a clear case of a double speech act: after arguing for this claim, I proceed to show that qua assertion, the act is correct given one’s preferred normative account, whereas it is incorrect qua blaming, as in order to perform such an act, the speaker needs to satisfy the conditions and.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,599

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Assertion and Rejection.Julian J. Schlöder - 2022 - In Daniel Altshuler, Linguistics Meets Philosophy. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Assertion and Its Many Norms.John N. Williams - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):39-76.
Assertion.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - In Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473.
Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson and back again.Neri Marsili - 2015 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 2014:112-130.
Can the Knowledge Norm Co‐Opt the Opt Out?Kevin Dorst - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):273-282.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-21

Downloads
57 (#412,302)

6 months
8 (#524,081)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Norms of Speech Acts.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2022 - Studia Semiotyczne 36 (11):45-56.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

View all 24 references / Add more references