Abstract

In a series of recent articles, Jean Hampton has argued that the widely accepted instrumental conception of reason is no more metaphysically benign than non-instrumental, typically moral, theories of reason. The purpose of this article is to provide the beginnings of a defence of instrumental conception of reason against Hampton's charges. In the first part, I take up her claim that instrumental norms rest on the same notion of normative authority as that employed by non-instrumental, or moral, theories. I argue in response that the normativity involved in instrumental reasoning is no more problematic than that involved in deductive theoretical reasoning. In the second part of the article I take up Hampton's claim that the motivational force of instrumental norms can only be explained in the same nonnatural way as the motivational force of non-instrumental, or moral, norms. I argue in response that the motivational force of instrumental norms can be explained in a way analogous to the entirely naturalistic explanation of the "motivational force" of deductive theoretical norms. In sum, I argue that instrumental reasoning, unlike moral reasoning, is no more metaphysically problematic than deductive theoretical reasoning.