Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude‐Content Distinction

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):359-386 (2019)
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Abstract

Typical emotions share important features with paradigmatic intentional states, and therefore might admit of distinctions made in theory of intentionality. One such distinction is between attitude and content, where we can specify the content of an intentional state separately from its attitude, and therefore the same content can be taken up by different intentional attitudes. According to some philosophers, emotions do not admit of this distinction, although there has been no sustained argument for this claim. In this article, I argue that the way values figure in emotional experience qualifies the content of emotional experience such that the attitude-content distinction cannot be applied.

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Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

Fear of the Past.Davide Bordini & Giuliano Torrengo - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
Intentional Feelings, Practical Agency, and Normative Commitments.Mary Carman - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):88-111.
A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.

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