Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief

In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press (2011)
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Veli Mitova
University of Johannesburg

Citations of this work

Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.
The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists.Alexandre Duval & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (26).
Scalar Epistemic Consequentialism.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):1-5.

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