Abstract

At its core, natural law theory claims that certain moral truths exist and are known, in varying degrees, by all rational persons. While I agree with this general statement, it is my contention that we must re-examine the manner in which the precepts of natural law are known. It is frequently assumed that any theory of natural law must presuppose the possibility of tradition-independent rationality whereby each rational person can directly access universal moral truths; the ability of each person to know moral truth in a rationally autonomous fashion without dependence on such things as authority, submission, and trust; and the explicit nature of moral knowing, whereby the precepts of natural law admit of full articulation. These three presuppositions must be reconsidered. Three twentieth-century thinkers who have, in different ways, attempted to overcome what they perceive to be an errant understanding of knowledge are Michael Oakeshott, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Polanyi. While only MacIntyre claims to be a natural law thinker, the insights provided by all three, especially Polanyi, provide the conceptual tools necessary for a new understanding of natural law theory. Such a reconceptualization will, like traditional natural law, affirm the existence of moral truth grounded in an essential human nature. But in addition, this approach will appreciate what I term the epistemic role of tradition, which shows that a tradition-independent theory of knowledge is philosophically incoherent; the necessity of authority, submission, and trust, without which knowing cannot occur; the indispensable role played by tacit knowledge. Because reality is only provisionally knowable, moral inquiry is an on-going effort better to comprehend the moral truth to which we are responsible