Abstract

Aristotle’s argument against Timaeus’ view of intellection as an endless circular motion can be divided into two main sections: a categorial one, which rests upon the impossibility of intertwining material and immaterial ingredients into a single (albeit twofold) substance; and a geometrical one, which highlights those features of circular magnitudes which render them unsuitable for performing intellectual tasks. This paper focuses on the first set of reasons that Aristotle puts forward, by stressing the productive philosophical outcome of this otherwise perplexing doxographical survey. It is argued that Aristotle’s own notions of ‘contact’ and ‘unmoved mover’ are greatly indebted to his critical scrutiny of Timaeus’ cosmogony. Further, the paper holds that the version of ‘causal synonymy’ that Aristotle discovers in Timaeus’ εἰκὼς μûθος leads him to recast this principle, in order to avoid unwelcome ‘physiological’ consequences. In this way, Aristotle’s literal reading of Timaeus’ εἰκὼς μûθος emerges as a plausible interpretive stance.