Normativity and deflationary theories of truth

Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):179-193 (2008)
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Abstract

It has been argued that deflationary theories of truth stumble over the normativity of truth. This paper maintains that the normativity objection does not pose problems to at least one version of deflationism, minimalism. The rest of the paper discusses truth-related norms, showing that either they do not hold or they are not troublesome for deflationism.

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10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.03

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Bruno Mölder
University of Tartu

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