The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: Affective Intentionality and Position-Taking

Emotion Review 14 (4):244-253 (2022)
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Abstract

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 244-253, October 2022. This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind of role they play in our mental lives. More specifically, I argue that the way we feel in having an emotion is not a perception-like awareness of evaluative properties of its object, but instead constitutes the taking of a stand or position on this object in light of its evaluative properties.

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Author's Profile

Jean Moritz Müller
University of Tübingen

References found in this work

Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.
Emotions and formal objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.

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