Wright on Borderline Cases and Bivalence

Abstract

The aim of this paper is, firstly to explain Crispin Wright’s quandary view of vagueness, his intuitionistic response to sorites and the relation of borderline cases and bivalence, and, secondly assess the objections to his ideas.

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