Abstract

The article outlines the prospects of using J. Hintikka’s interrogative epistemology for modelling cognitive operations carried out by a cognizing agent to create a machine capable of full cognition. It was established that modeling is divided into two objectives: modeling the cognitive operations and modeling the strategic reasoning. Interrogative epistemology presents a solution to the first objective. It relies on a game-theoretic formal apparatus that allows one to correctly describe all types of possible moves within the framework of a particular cognitive game. The second objective cannot be accomplished in a general epistemological theory framework since strategic considerations about the organization of research and even the concept of knowledge inevitably depend on the broader context of an agent’s practical activity. Therefore, interrogative epistemology does not claim a universal and complete description of the process of cognition, focusing on other tasks: primarily on identifying hidden premises that cognitive agents use in their reasoning. For the same reason, interrogative epistemology deems the possibility of the existence of a cognizing machine as formally unsubstantiated and questionable. However, arguments are given in favor of the fact that interrogative epistemology serves as an acceptable conceptual framework for clarifying the nature of the difficulties that arise with attempts to accomplish the second objective and improving the quality of philosophical discourse in the field of artificial intelligence research. The author substantiates this position by arguing that the ability to cognize presupposes the ability to perform all the essential functions that are usually called mental.