It was not supposed to happen like that: blameworthiness, causal deviance and luck

Philosophical Studies 180 (2):439-449 (2022)
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Abstract

I consider cases in which a person’s action causes a foreseeable harm, but does so through an unforeseeable causal path. According to a common view, the person is blameless for the harm in such cases. I argue that any defense of this common view incurs serious costs. I then show how a popular view about resultant luck can make the rejection of the common view palatable.

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2023

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10.1007/s11098-022-01883-6

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Martin Montminy
University of Oklahoma

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References found in this work

Taking luck seriously.Michael Zimmerman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (11):553-576.
Culpable ignorance.Holly Smith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (4):543-571.
The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.
The Moral of Moral Luck.Susan Wolf - 2001 - Philosophic Exchange 31 (1).

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