Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness

The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281 (2018)
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Abstract

We propose an original response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. This response combines a hard-line and a soft-line. Like hard-liners, we insist that the manipulated agent is blameworthy for his wrongdoing. However, like soft-liners, we maintain that there is a difference in blameworthiness between the manipulated agent and the non-manipulated one. The former is less blameworthy than the latter. This difference is due to the fact that it is more difficult for the manipulated agent to do the right thing. We explain how we can make sense of this notion of difficulty in terms of Fischer and Ravizza’s notion of reasons-responsiveness.

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Martin Montminy
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):431-452.
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will.Alex Kaiserman - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):687-709.

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References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.

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