Justice Principles, Empirical Beliefs, and Cognitive Biases: Reply to Buchanan's ‘When Knowing What Is Just and Being Committed to Achieving it Is Not Enough’

Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (5):736-741 (2021)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT This article raises three concerns about Buchanan's argument related to the individualist description of ideology and psychological description of the obstacles to justice, as well as the way in which he separates empirical and normative beliefs, which, the article argues, are much more closely connected in all the examples that he raises. In the end, however, it agrees with Buchanan's central contention concerning the cognitive biases that interfere with progress towards justice, but, it argues, these operate at a more sub‐conscious level than described by Buchanan.

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Margaret R. Moore
Queen's University

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