Split brains and atomic persons

Philosophy of Science 49 (March):91-106 (1982)
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Abstract

Many have claimed that split-brain patients are actually two persons. I maintain that both the traditional separation argument and the more recent sophistication argument for the two persons interpretation are inadequate on conceptual grounds. An autonomy argument is inadequate on empirical grounds. Overall, theoretical and practical consequences weigh heavily in favor of adopting a one person interpretation

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References found in this work

Brain bisection and personal identity.Roland Puccetti - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (April):339-55.
What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at ‘split-brain’ man.Daniel N. Robinson - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):73-78.
Further discussion of split brains and hemispheric capabilities.Joseph E. Bogen - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (September):281-6.
The other side of the brain: An appositional mind.Joseph E. Bogen - 1968 - Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Society 34:135-62.

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