Abstract
In writing his metaphysics in the form of “meditations,” Descartes specifically rejects two other forms: “synthesis,” the form of a deductive proof common in ancient geometry, and “disputation,” the form of a dialectical defense of a thesis against an antithesis. Both forms, Descartes argues, impede a reader’s ability to discover the material “as if for herself” and endanger instilling in her a cynicism towards philosophy. Descartes instead chose the form of “analysis” for the presentation of his metaphysics, which he asserts is the “best and truest method of instruction.” What can philosophy teachers learn from these claims? We too rely on pedagogical forms that are broadly synthetic and disputative, and we too can recognize a student’s sudden suspicion of philosophy. I argue that Descartes’s pedagogical comments offer a solution to help us avoid this classroom danger of misology.
