Denying the doctrine and changing the subject

Journal of Philosophy 70 (15):503-510 (1973)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I discuss Quine's claim that anyone denying what we now take to be a logical truth would be using logical words in a novel way. I trace this to a confusions between outright denial and failure to assert, and assertion of a negation. (This abstract is written from memory decades after the article.)

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth.Matthew McKeon - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):205-224.
On an Argument for Truth-Functionality.Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 269.
Logic as Metaphysics.Nick Zangwill - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (10):517-550.
Logical truth revisited.Peter G. Hinman, Jaegwon Kim & Stephen P. Stich - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (17):495-500.
Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
865 (#26,417)

6 months
127 (#41,443)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
The philosophy of alternative logics.Andrew Aberdein & Stephen Read - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The development of modern logic. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 613-723.
Quine and Slater on paraconsistency and deviance.Francesco Paoli - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):531-548.
Sentence connectives in formal logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references