Towards Subject Matters for Counterpossibles

Studia Semiotyczne 35 (2):125-152 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I raise the problem of dealing with counterpossible conditionals for theories of subject matter. I argue that existing accounts of subject matter need to be revised and extended to be able to a) provide reasonable (potentially non-degenerate) verdicts about what counterpossibles are about, b) explain the intuition that counterpossibles are in some sense about what would happen if the antecedent were true, and c) explain in what sense counterpossibles can be about individuals. I sketch how one could extend atom-based and way-based theories of subject matters to handle the problem. Then, I raise the problem that it might be desirable for a theory of subject matter to prevent the inference that certain counterpossibles are about the kinds of things that they seem to mention.

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Felipe Morales Carbonell
University of Chile

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References found in this work

A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Boris Christian Kment - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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