Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelson's notions of coherence cannot be accepted

Abstract

In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
77 (#273,099)

6 months
6 (#869,904)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luca Moretti
University of Eastern Piedmont

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references