On Basic Knowledge without Justification

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):305 - 310 (1985)
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Abstract

Recently Robert Almeder has invoked Aristotle's celebrated regress argument to argue for the existence of basic knowledge that does not require the satisfaction of any justification condition. After outlining Almeder's argument, I shall show why it ultimately fails.Aristotle's regress argument in Book I of the Posterior Analytics is basically that because we have inferential knowledge, we must also have non-inferential knowledge. Aristotle plausibly assumes that to know the conclusion of an argument on the basis of its premises, one must know its premises. But he notes that if knowledge of any premise requires knowledge of some other proposition, then knowing any proposition would require knowledge of each member of an infinite regress of propositions. According to Aristotle, we cannot know each member of such a regress, but we do have some inferential knowledge; consequently there must be some basic, non-inferential knowledge, i.e., knowledge that does not depend for its justification on inferential relations to other known propositions.

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Paul K. Moser
Loyola University, Chicago

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References found in this work

The coherence theory of empirical knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (5):281 - 312.
Cognitive Systematisation.Nicholas Rescher - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):411-413.
Basic Knowledge and Justification.Robert F. Almeder - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):115-127.

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