Temporal Delusion: 'Duality' Accounts of Time and Double Orientation to Reality in Depressive Psychosis

Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):163-183 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper argues that 'duality' accounts of time, as exemplified by Henri Bergson's, Edmund Husserl's, and John McTaggart's ideas, parallel the decomposition of temporal experience in depressive psychosis into objective and subjective dimensions of time. The paper also proposes to comprehend the full-fledged depressive temporal delusion, in which the subjective flow of time comes to a standstill, via the idea of a double orientation to reality characteristic of schizophrenic delusions. In the depressive temporal delusion a person claims that time is not moving while simultaneously her cognitive orientation in temporal surroundings remains largely unaffected, hence the double orientation. The juxtaposition of temporal experience in depression with the temporal disorientation in dementia enables us to situate the depressive delusion regarding the flow of time in the middle of a proposed scale of the disintegration of normal temporal experience.

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References found in this work

Double bookkeeping in delusions: Explaining the gap between saying and doing.Lisa Bortolotti - 2010 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 237--256.
Self-experience in Dementia.Michela Summa & Thomas Fuchs - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (2):387-405.

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