Two paradoxes of rational acceptance

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Erkenntnis 23 (2):127 - 141 (1985)
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Abstract

This article provides a straightforward diagnosis and resolution of the lottery paradox and the epistemic version of the paradox of the preface. In doing so, The article takes some steps in relating the notion of probability to the notion of epistemic justification.

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10.1007/bf00169962

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Jeffrey Tlumak
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
Logic of the preface paradox.Dale Jacquette - 2008 - Principia 12 (2):203-216.

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