The Notion of Kairos and it’s Modern Philosophical Aspects

Phainomena 39 (2002)
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Abstract

Kairos – which is a measure just as much as a value – is an intentional creation of consciousness, and one that respects the nature of the real. Furthermore it is an effective means for existence to grasp the meaning and the importance of the way in which the latter acts upon the world, since it makes the distinction between modes of “coming towards” and “going away from”. Even as consciousness follows the slow but sure ripening of the situations it is committed to, and even as a fixes in advance the minimal and optimal instant whereafter these situations are at risk of disintegrating, it proceeds to draw nearer to that instant, which thenceforward has the status of an objective datum able to link objective realty. It follows that the categories of not yet and never again are no mere abstractions, but a good rendering of the structure of the activity of existence. The kairic attitude is one, which is deeply rooted in human realty. This being so, whenever we want to set up an authentic image of the activity of consciousness, viewed in all its possible aspects, we necessarily have the right to replace a static system, the traditional temporal categories, with a dynamic one, the kairos categories

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