Delusions: A Different Kind of Belief?

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):27-37 (2014)
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Abstract

Delusions, a key feature of psychosis, are usually thought of as a type of belief, as in the definition of the American Psychiatric Association: A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith). This characterization is often criticized, but other definitions typically comprise similar elements. For some, delusions are only loosely considered as beliefs (Jaspers 1963; Moor and Tucker ..

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Grant Gillett
University of Otago

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