Abstract

A philosophy of the social world needs, if it is to be viable, a concrete analysis of the ethical and political implications of social types which shape human actions. This dissertation explores ethical and political implications for individuals freedom that arise from social typification. ;Social types are those social roles, or stereotypes, that define ourselves and others, determining appropriate patterns of action. Social types are so embedded in society that no aspect of the social world is free of them. On an ethical level, social types can severely limit the power, freedom, and automony of an individual, by restricting the choices possible for action. On a political level, social types can be used as tools of power by one social group against another, severely restricting the freedom, and range of possibilities for the latter group. It is vital, therefore, for a philosophy of the social world to inquire into the ethical and political implications of social types within the full context of human situations. ;First, how social types appear and are constituted is examined by a study of Alfred Schutz' phenomenology of social typification. Secondly, ethical and political issues concerning social typification are analyzed by placing in new light the existential phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre. Thirdly, the presence of social power in social typification is investigated by an ethnomethodological account of the social construction of social types. ;The construction of the social world, unfolded through examination of the constitution, the ethical and political implications, and the power structure of social types, raises critical questions: Are social types necessary? Do social types engender oppression for individuals and groups of people. A philosophical analysis of social types shows that individual freedom can be enhanced by moving beyond practices of social typification