Abstract

Semantic internalism is the view that linguistic meaning amounts to forms of conceptual instructions, and that the process of forming linguistic representations does not involve reference to extra-mental entities. Contemporary philosophy of language remains predominantly externalist in focus, having developed systems of extensional reference which depart from classical rationalist assumptions. Semantic internalism is defended here using a broad range of case studies. Particular focus is be placed on exemplar cases such as natural kind and artifactual terms. Typical natural kind terms are shown to have their meaning constructed via a range of cognitive faculties (considerations of material basis being only one of them), and consulting basic properties of language processing and parsing can explain our intuitions about common word use, a major goal of the internalist enterprise. Copredication via inherent polysemy is used as a strong source of evidence for internalism, countering the received view of the externalist character of meaning. Semantic internalism is comprehensively defended against its critics, pushing the exploration of linguistic content and meaning “back into the head”.