What Does it Take to be Oneself? Raz, Frankfurt and Being a Person

Res Publica:1-19 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Joseph Raz intended to clarify the ‘boundary between my life as I lead it, and what happens to me in my life’. Such boundary is given by my relationship with the reasons I believe that I have. My aim is to present a broadly Razian account of what it means to be active in our lives. The basic idea is that I can see myself as active insofar as I can make sense of my own life in terms of reasons that I believe that apply to me. I will also engage with Harry Frankfurt’s criticisms. Firstly, Frankfurt believed that the Razian account is implausible because the idea of choosing an action without having reasons makes sense. Secondly, being active, says Frankfurt, is less about being in touch with our perceived reasons and more about what he calls wholeheartedness. I will defend the account against both kinds of criticism.

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