What is left of irrationality?

Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):808-818 (2023)
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Abstract

In his recent book Bad Beliefs and Why They Happen to Good People, Neil Levy argues that conspiracy theories result from the same rational processes that underlie epistemic success. While we think many of Levy’s points are valuable, like his criticism of the myth of individual cognition and his emphasis on the importance of one’s social epistemic environment, we believe that his account overlooks some important aspects. We argue that social deference is an active process, and as such can be helped or hindered by epistemic virtues and vices. With this in mind, holders of bad beliefs acquire more responsibility than is considered by Levy.

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Author Profiles

Kathleen Murphy-Hollies
University of Birmingham
Chiara Caporuscio
Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin

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