Sentiments

In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press (2017)
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Abstract

I discuss the intuitive distinction between emotions and sentiments, and argue that sentiments cannot be reduced to emotions (and hence constitute their own category of affective state). ​

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Hichem Naar
University of Duisburg-Essen

Citations of this work

Hate: toward a Four-Types Model.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):441-459.
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Emotions as states.Hichem Naar - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):71-90.
Blame as a sentiment.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (3):239-253.

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