Probability and Truth in the Apology

Philosophy and Literature 9 (2):198-202 (1985)
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Abstract

This article is a reply to an earlier piece by kenneth seeskin (philosophy and literature, 1982). I argue that socrates' defense is more of a parody of gorgian rhetoric than seeskin is willing to allow. They key lies in socrates' use of rhetoric to persuade the beliefs of the athenian jurors by means of probabilities. When replying to the expressed pretexts of the trial, He uses "base" rhetoric; when finally attending to the real reasons behind his accusations, He resorts to "the truth about his life."

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Steven Nadler
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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